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ABSTRACTS OF RI ECENT DECISIONS.
to indace him to do this, or any promise
made afterwards in consideration of such
service would be void. This is founded
upon thu general consideration of fitness
and expediency. Such advice and solicitation, in whatever form the agency
may be executed, are understood to be
disinterested, and to flow from a single
regard to the interests of the parties.
They are lawful only so far as they are
free anti disinterested. If such advicd
and solicitation, thus understood to be
pure and disinterested, may be justly
offered from mercenary motives, they
would produce all the consequences of
absolute misrepresentation and falsehood.
It- is understood to be the offer of disinterested good offices, and the measure
proposed to be recommended by the unbiased judgment of the person offering
it; whereas, it is, in fact, an offer flowing from unavowed motives of pecuniary
interest, and the recommendation is the
result of &judgment biased by ahope of
a large reward. If rewards might be
taken in consideration of the exertion of
direct or indirect influence, either-by the
person acting under it or by others who
should be influenced and moved by him,
itwonld destroy all confidence ; it would
lead to. false and unfair representations
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and dealings, and be productive of inflnite mischief."
The cases which illustrate the general
principles so well stated are numerous.
Only a few will be cited. An agreement by which one promises to use his
influence with the directors of a railroad
company to secure for another a lucrative
building contract, is injurious in its tendency and not enforceable by action:
.Daisonv. Seymour, 1 Bosw. 88. See,
also, Bliss v. Matteson, 52 Barb. 335.
In like manner a contract by a
stockholder in a railroad company for a
pecuniary consideration to procure the
building of the terminus or depot, upon
or opposite the land of the defendant, is
illegal and' void on account of its tendency to bias the judgment of the directors
in a matter where they- should consult
solely the welfare of the company, and
the convenience of the public: Fullerv.
Dame, 18 Pick. 472 ;.ffolladaly v. Patterson, S Oreg. 177.
A large number of cases illustrating
the generatprinciple of the-principal case,
but too- numerous to be here cited, will
be found in the note to Collins v. Btantern, IT Smith's Lead. Cas. (8th Am.
ed.) 741 et set.
c. D. oWELL.
Chicago.
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ACCORD.
XVote qf T/drd Personfor less Sum.-If a debtor gives and the credI Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term, 1885. Tie cases will probably appear in 115 U. S. Rep.
2 From J. II. Lumpkin, E,,l., Reporter; to appear in 73 or 74 Ga. Rep.
- From lion. N. L. Freeman ; to appear in 114 Ill. Rep.
4 From J. W. Spaulding, E-q., Reporter; to appear in 77 Me. Rep.
5 From Join) H. 'Stewart, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 40 N. J. Eq. Rep.
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itor receives, in falI satisfaction of the debt, a note endorsed by a third
person for a less sum than the aniount of the debt, it is a good accord
and satisfaction to bar a subsequent suit -by the creditor to recover the
balance of the debt: Varney v. Conery, 77 Me.
ADMIRALTY.

Charter-Party-Penal,-LignideitedDamages.-The clause in a
charter-party by which the parties mutually bind themselves, the
ship and freight, and the merchandise to be laden on board, "in the
penal sum of estimated amount of freight," to the performance of all
and every of their agreements, is not a stipulation for liquidated damages, but a penalty to secure the payment of the amount of damage that
either party may actually suffer from any breach of the contract; and
is to be so treated in a court of admiralty of the United States, whatever may be the rule-in the courts of the particular state in which the
contract is made and the court of admiralty sits: Watts v. Camors,
S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1885.
See Bills and Notes; Lisurance.

AGENT.

ASSIGNMENT.

Chose in Action-Oral Assiqnment.-To make an oral assignment of
a debt due on account valid, as against creditors, or between parties
even, there must be a valuable consideration therefor, and at least a
symbolical or constructive delivery; although the delivery may be evidenced by a less significant act than is required for the assignment of a
chose in action, which is capable of manual delivery like an execution,
note or bond: White v. Kilgore, 77 Me.
ATTACHMENT.
BANK.

See .Eamntion.

See Corporation.

BILLS AND NOTES.

Consideration- Wagering Con tract-Futures-Brokers-Bonafide
Purchaser.-Contractsfor the purchase and sale of cotton "futures"
are illegal, and all evidences of debt executed on such consideration are
void, even in the hands of a bonafide purchaser before due and without
notice: National Bank of Augusta v. Cunningham, 73 or 74 Ga.
The payers of the note in question, being connected, in bringing about
the transaction and carrying the same through, were particeps criminis,
so, that their contract, growing out of an illegal transaction, was void: Id
They could not recover for services rendered or losses incurred in
forwarding the transaction: Il.
See Limitations, Statute of; Municipal Corporations.
Power of State over Contractsof 0ity with Gas Company.-A grant
by the legislature of Louisiana, to a corporation, of the exclusive privilege, for a certain period, of manufcieturing and distributing gas in the
city of New Orleans, by means of pipes, mains and conduits, to suchi
persons as might choose to contract for the same, upon certain condiCONSTITUTIONAL. LAW.
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tions, is a contract within the scope of the authority conferred by the
constitution of the state and is binding upon the parties. While, in the
exercise of its police power, the state may establish and enforce such
regulations, not inconsistent with the essential rights granted in such a
charter, as may be necessary for the protection of the public, yet she
cannot, either by. her organic law or legislative enactment, impair the
obligation of the contract- lNew Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light
C., S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 188.5.
CONTRACT.

Right to Rescinal-( stom-Evidence.--Where a purchaser of a lot
of corn, to be delivered to him at a future time, agrees,- as a part of the
contract of sale, to make such advances from time to time as the seller
may require, if the purchaser refuses to make an advance when demanded, except upon condition that the vendor shall give his note for
the amount, the seller may rescind the contract, and refuse to deliver
the corn: ai/bertv. eGlnuis,-114 Ill.
Where a commercial contract is in any respect ambiguous, a particular custom or usage of trade known to the parties, or which, under the
circumstances, they are presumed to know, or any previous course of
dealing between them that will have a tendency to- disclose the real
intention of the parties, and to aid the
court in arriving at the true con- M.
struction, is admisible in evidence
Evidence of a particular custom or usage of trade is also adeissile,
for the purpose of engrafting, as it were, new terms into a contract, subject, however, to the qualification that such terms are not expressly or
impliedly excluded by the express agreement. To have this effect the
custom or usage must be reasonable, and not in conflict with any general
rule of law : .[&
Rut it is not admissible to prove a custom or usage the effect of which
will be to add to an express agreement a condition or limitation which is
repugnant to or inconsistent with the agreement itself Such evidence
is. never admitted to vary or contradict, either expressly or by implication, the terms of an agreement, written or verbal: IdIn February a person agreed to sell to another a quantity of corn at a
stipulated price per bushel, to be delivered in the months of August and
September following, and the purchaser, as a part of the same agreement.
promised to make advances on the contract to the seller of what money,
he might, from time to time, require. It was held, in a suit upon the
contract brought by the purchaser for non-delivery of the corn, that evidence that a custom or usage prevailed requiring the vendor to give to
the vendee his note upon receiving any sucl advances, was not admissible in behalf of the plaintiff, as it was inconsistent with the express
contract: Id.
Phystci'an Practisingwithout License-Rg t to Recoverfor Servic-.The fact that a physician failed for a short time after December 1st
1881, to register under section 1409 et seg. of the code, is not sufficient to defeat his right to recover for professional services rendered
after that date and befbre his registry, where it appeared that he was a
regular practisimg physician, that he applied to register in time and
could not do so because the clerk had failed to provide a book, and that
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he did register early in January thereafter as soon as he could do so:
Parrishv. Foss, 73 or 74 Ga.
The case is distinguishable from stringent rules laid down in cases of
sales of liquor and guano contrary to law: Id.
The services of physicians are necessary and called for upon pressing
emergencies, and if this physician had applied for a mandamus against
the clerk, his patients would have been compelled to wait, and he could
not have obtained a registry sooner than he did actually register : Id.
Railroad- Control of by Ownership of Atock.-The MIissouri Pacific
Rd. Co. contracted with the Pullman Car Co. that the latter should
have the exclusive right for a term of years to furnish sleeping cars on
all passenger trains of the railway company, and " over its entire line of
railway, and on all roads which it controls, or may hereafter control,
by ownership, lease, or otherwise." The railroad company afterwards
consolidated with other roads, forming a new corporation under the name
of Missouri Pacific Rd. Co. Subsequently, the new company acquired
a large majority of the stock of the St. Louis, &c., Rd. Co., and the
two roads were operated under one management, though each road kept
up its own corporate organization. ield, that the railroad of the St.
Louis, &c., Rd. Co. is not controlled by the present M5issouri Pacific
Rd. Co. in such a way as to require that company to use Pullman cars
over that road, even if the contract were binding on the new company,
precisely as if"
the old company were still in existence, and standing
in the place of the new. Though the lissouri Pacific Rd. Co., by
owning a majority of stock of the St. Louis, &c., Rd. Co., may have
all the advantages of a control of the road, yet that is not in law-the
control itself. Practically, it may control the company, but the company
alone controls its road: Pullman Car Co. v. Missouri Pac. Rd. Co.,
S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1885.
CORPORATION.

Receiver when Appointed-FactsNecessary to be STwn.-Allegations
in a bill that the company is insolvent and has suspended its business
for want of funds to carry on the same, are not sufficient in a bill to have
a corporation declared insolvent and a receiver appointed. The facts
and circumstances must be set out from which the insolvency of the
corporation shall appear: The Newfoundland Railway Construction Co.
v. Schacl , 40 N. J. Eq.
Section 84 of the corporation act (Rev. p. 182) authorizes the dissolution of a corporation before the time limited in the certificate of incorporation in its charter, by the resolution of the majority of the whole board
of directors, at a meeting called for that purpose, on three days' notice
to each director, and the consent of two-thirds in interest of all its stockholders, at a- meeting of the stockholders convened upon notice, such
consent being expressed in meeting, and being duly attested by its secretary and filed in the office of the secretary of state. The 57th section
makes the directors of the corporation at the time of its dissolution its
trustees to close up its business, pay its debts, and divide the surplus
remaining among the stockholders. The 16th section authorizes the
chancellor, upon the dissolution of a corporation, either to continue the
directors as trustees or to appoint a receiver for the corporation. Held,
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that the power of the chancellor to interpose and take from the directors
the power to close up the business of the corporation and to put its
affairs in the hands of a receiver, is a discretionary power to be exercised only on good cause shown, upon circumstances disclosed by the
proofs which show the need of the interference of the court for the protection of creditors or stockholders from breaches of trust by the
directors in the performance of their duties : Id.
Directors-Liabitityfor Hismanagement-Statute of Limitations.The managers- of a savings bank stand in the relationship of trustees to
the depositors, so that-the statute of limitations will not be a bar-against
a charge of mismanagement ort their part, which had occurred more than
six years before the filing of the bill: Williams v. JlcKay, 40 N. J.
Although such managers are unpaid; they are to be held liable for the
want of ordinary care and diligence in the management of the affairs of
the institution: M.
When the bill shows a long and systematic violation of the-directions
of the charter by the president and. committee-men, it is a prima faeie
presumption that such course of misconduct was known to the managers, and the latter cannot demur to the bill on the ground that such
misconduct is not traced to them: Hc.
COVENANT.

Private Road-Eincroachrsent-Iiyunction-Statuteof Litn'tations.
-In 1859 L. conveyed a tract of land to S., by a deed containing a
covenant, that L., his heirs and assigns, would thereafter keep open a
private road, two- rods wide, from the public road to-the rear of the lands
conveyed, and directly south thereof. L. then also owned the land
southward. S's land now belongs to complainant, and L.'s to- defendant,
their respective conveyances containing the covenant ; held, that complainant could enjoin defendant from encroaching on the private road
by erecting piazzas, fences, &c., and that lie was not estopped by knowledge of defendant's intention to build the structures and of their subsequent erection, an( offered no resistance; and that the statute of
limitations was no defence; Gawtry v. Leland, 40 N. J. Eq.
CRIMINAT. LAw.

Evidence of Distinct Acts-Election.-Where several witnesses testified to distinct beatings given the wife by the husband, at no great
intervals apart, but all within two years before the indictment was-found,
no two of the witnesses testifying to the same cruel treatment, it was
error for the court to compel the state to elect one of these transactions
on which it would rely, and when the election was made, rule out all the
evidence in relation to the others : Memberv. The State, 73 or 74 Ga.
1nsanit-Burden of PToof.-A request to charge that the prisoner's
sanity must be shown by the same amount of proof that is required to
establish guilt in all other eases, that is to the exclusion of all reasonable doubt, was properly refused : Danforth v. State, 73 or 74 Geo.
The rule is that, in criminal as well as in civil cases, insanity should
be established by a preponderance of testimony : Id.
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Reasonable Doubt.-The law does not require that the jury shall
believe that every fact in a criminal case has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, before they can find the accused guilty. The reasonable
doubt the jury is permitted to entertain must be as to the guilt of the
accused on the whole evidence, and not as to any particular 'act in the
case : Davis v. The People, 114 I1.
DAMAGES.
Bond-Penal Sum.-Liguidated Damages-Barber-shop.-Where a
bond in the usual form was given in the sum of five hundred dollars,
conditioned that the obligor should never open and keep a barber-shop
within a certain town, the sum named will be regarded as a penalty and
not as liquidated damages: Burrill v. Dagyett, 77 Me.
In such cases, the intention of the parties is to govern, and for that
purpose it is necessary, 1. To look at the whole instrument; 2. Its subject-matter; 3. The ease or difficulty in tudasuring the breach in damages; 4. The magnitude of the stipulated sum, not only as compared
with the value of the subject of the contract, but in -proportion to the
probable consequences of the breach : -ild.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

.8'audulent Conveyance-Secret Trustfor Grantor-SubsequentCreditors.-A person being.in debt, conveyed his real and personal property
to his son, under an agreement made for the purpose on the part of
both, to defeat, hinder and delay a creditor in the collection of his debt,
no consideration being paid therefor, and with a secret understanding that
the son should hold the property for the use and benefit of the ftther,
and reconvey it to him when requested; and if the father did not require
a reconveyance, the son to take care of him and provide him with necessaries during his life, and have the property at his death. It was held,
the sale and conveyance were fraudulent and void as to creditors of the
father: Gordon v. Reynolds, 114 Ill.
Even where the grantee pays a valuable consideration, if a part of the
consideration is an undertaking and promise by the grantee to support
and take care of the grantor, such an agreement renders the transfer
void as to then existing creditors of the grantor . Td.
If the fraudulent grantor reserves no future use or benefit in the pro-:
perty, then the transfer can be attacked only by pre-existing creditors;
but where the conveyance is merely colorable, and a secret trust exists
for the benefit of the grantor, then the sale is void, both as to precedent
and subsequent creditors: Id.
Purchaseby Insolvelit -Fraud-Billin EquiV-Parties.-Where one
purchases goods, being insolvent and not intending to pay for them, and
conceals his insolvency and his intention not to pay, he 'is guilty of a
fraud which entitles the vendor, if no innocent third party has acquired
-an interest in them, to disaffirm the contract and recover the goods:
Johnson v. O'Donnell, 73 or 74 Ga.
The bill shows that the plaintiff's goods were purchased by O'Donnell
& B., and have been fraudulently transferred to other defendants in the
bill. The subject-matter is the goods of plaintiffs, and to avoid a multiplicity of suits, a court of equity would have jurisdiction, there being
Id.
no objection of multifariousness or misjoinder of defendants:
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DECEDENTS' ESTATES.

Sale for Payment of Debts-Power of Court-Adverse Title.-In a
proceeding by an administrator for leave to sell land to pay debts, the
court, exercising but a mere statutory authority, has no jurisdiction to
settle, and. determine conflicting titles to the land, or to remove clouds
upon title. If the paramount owner of the land is made a defendant,
it would doubtless be his duty to assert his rights to, the same in his
answer not for the purpose of forming an issue to be tried in that proceeding, but for the purpose of giving notice of his rights, and thus
prevent an estoppel ih pais: Harding v. Le~foyne, 114 Il.
As a necessary incident to the power to make the sale, the court must
also determine whatever questions may arise in respect to the payment
of the purchase-money or the sufficiency of the conveyance, and in
short, all questions relating to the sale. In respect to the land, the court
can find only the fact that the deceased had title or a claim to the samer
and the sale will be subject to all adverse independent claims of title:
Id.
The court, whether the circuit or county court, under whose decree
an administrator sells land to pay debts, has no right or authority of law
to enter an order requiring- the delivery of possession to the purchaser
by parties claiming an independent title thereto. The purchaser must
establish his right to the possession by an action in a court of law-where
legal titles are cognisable : Id.
DEED. See CovenantEscrow-Effect of Leifvery to the -rantee.-There cannot be a delivery of a-deed to the grantee in escrow. Such delivery makes the deed
an absolute one to the grantee: Stevenson, v. CraOpnell, 114 I1.
Alill-dam.--A deed, wherein the grantor gives, grants, bargains, sells
and conveys unto the grantee, his heirs and assigns forever, the right
of having, building and maintaining, and repairing, and keeping in
repair a dam oir certain premises, with the right to so much of the
premises as may be necessary on which to build and maintain the dam
with. its wings, conveys a fee in the land upon which the dam stands:
Inhabitantsof Monmouth v. Plimpton, 77 Me.
DOM lOLE.
Residence-Miwr-Pauper-ettiement.-That a minor daughter
should depart from home for temporary employment, leaving such. articles of clothing and bedding as she did not require for use, even though
she receive the wages for her labor for her own useis not so uncommon
an occurrence as to authorize an. inference of such a- change in the
parental and filial ties as to constitute emancipation: Inhatitants of
Searsmont v. Inhabitantsof Thorndike, 77 Me.
When the home ofa person is once established in a town it requires
less proof to show continudnce there than would be necessary to show
both the establishment and continuance. Bodily presence at all times
is not necessary to show continuance. The departure for a purpose in
its nature temporary, leaving behind articles not required for immediate
use, expressing an intention to return, and returning to visit, and to
repair wardrobe, and on account of sickness, are sufficient evidence of
the continuance: R.
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DOWER.
Division of Land 6y Partition-SeparateSuits.-Where land in which
a widow is entitled to dower has been divided, by partition, between
several different parties, she may properly bring a separate suit against
the owner of each portion. She may perhaps proceed against all in one
suit, but she is not compelled to do so: Coburn v. Herrington, 114 Il1.
EJEGTAIENT.

Ownership in Second Sto2y of Building.-Certain persons were permitted to build a public hall as a second story of a new school-house,
and an agent, authorized by the district, leased that second story to the
builders of it, with necessary easements of ingress and egress, and with
equitable provisions as to the use, repair of the building, &c., "so long
as the building shall stand."
The building in its several parts was
occupied in accordance with the agreement far nearly thirty years, when
the district voted "to'sell the school-house and lot under" the hall, and
by deed their agent conveyed all their interest in the lot and building
thereon. In a real action by the grantee against the occupants of the
hall, Reld, 1. That the title to the hall was never in the district, it
accrued to the builders before the execution of the instrument, called a
lease, by virtue of their having built it under a license from the district,
and the purpose of the paper was to regulate the use and manner of
using the hall. 2. That these regulations applying to the use, were not
conditions of a grant, for there was no grant, hence the remedy for a
breach would not be a forfeiture. 3. That there could be no forfeiture
without an entry, and the deed from the district conveyed no such right,
nor had the district made any such entry. 4. That the vote to sell did
not authorize a conveyance of the hall, and the deed could go no further
than the authority. 5. That the defendants, having disclaimed all but
the hall with its easements, and being in possession of that, have a color
of title, and the plaintiff had failed to show a better one: Peaks v.
Blethen, 77 Me.
EQUITY. See Debtor and Creditor; Decedent's Estates; Insurance;
Partition.
Parties- D'ustee and Cestui que Trust-Receiver.-A receiver filed a
bill in his own name to foreclose a mortgage made to A. in trust for B.
To establish his right to foreclose, the bill relied on a decree of the court
of chancery appointing him receiver. It not appearing by the recitals
of the bill that the decree transferred to the receiver the legal title which
A., as trustee, had in the mortgage: .eld, that A. was a necessary
party to the bill: Tyson v. Applegate, 40 N. J. Eq.
Further recitals in the bill justified the conclusion that the decree
divested B. of her interest in the ninrtgage, and vested tfiat interest in
three persons named in the bill. Held, that B. was not a necessary
party, but that the three persons in whom her interest was vested were
necessary parties to the bill : Id.
The rule that to a bill to foreclose a mortgage made to a trustee in
trust, the cestui que trust, as well as the trustee, shall be made a party,
is to be observed when the cestuis que trustent are known, and are not so
numerous as to make it impossible or highly inconvenient to include
them as parties : .d.
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Specific Peformance- Contractfor Sale of Lands- Tender-Parol
Evidence.-It is not essential to the enforcement of a contract for the
sale of lands that it should be signed by the complainant, as well as by
the defendant: Carskaddonv. kennedy, 40 N. J. Eq.
A- contract, induced by fraudulent representations would not be
enforced in equity, even though it appeared that the parties did not
intend to, make the representations a part of the contract : Id.
If a party refuse a tender of the purchase-money for land sold, on
the express ground that he is not bound to make any conveyance, he
cannot, afterwards, object to the propriety of the tender, on the ground
that the description of the land, in a deed which the purchaser, at the
time of the tender, requested him to execute, was erroneous : Id.
Oral evidence is not competent to establish an agreement to- change
the description of land previously bargained for by a written contract
signed by the vendor: d.

Public Records-Sworn 0opy/.-The contents of a public record may
be proved by the production of the record-itself, or by a copy duly certified by the proper officer, or by an examined copy sworn to by an
unofficial witness who made the examination z State v. Lynde, 77 Me.
Power of Court to Strike out.-Where, in a suit brought by the representatives of a deceased person, the testimony of the living defendant
concerning conversations and transactions had with the decedent is
admitted without objection, it is not in the power of the court afterward
to'strike it out- because- its admission is opposed to the statute. The
court can strike out testimony so admitted only when its exclusion- in
demanded by some consideration of public policy: Rowland v. Row-

laund, 40 N. J.Eq.
Averments in another Suit on Information and Belief.-Averments
made under oath, in a pleading in an action at law, are competent evidence in another suit against the party making them ; and the fact thaL
the averments are made on information and belief goes only to their
weight, and not to their admissibility as -evidence Pope- v. Allis, S.
G. U. S., Oct. Term 1&85.
EXEMPTION.
Waiver of-Invalidt.-A
general waiver of exemption of wages
from the process of garnishment, extending indefinitely to all the future
wages of the laborer, is void. and cannot be enforced against the pro-

missor: Green v. Watson, 7a or 74 Ga.
Whether a special waiver upon specific wages in a certain employment,
and for a certain time by specific orders on employers containing such
specific waiver, we do not decide- Id.
FRAUD.

See Debtor and 6editor; Sale.

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Promise to Pay the Debt of Another-New Consideration.-Where
the moving consideration for the promise to pay money is the liability
of*a third person, the promise must be in writing; but if there is a new
VOL. XYY.V.-19
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consideration moving from the promisee to the promisor, then the superadded consideration makes it a new agreement, which is not within the
Statute of Frauds: Power v. Rankin, 114 Ill.
So where a party having a chattel mortgage upon a lot of corn, to
secure a note of some $1200, relinquishes the same, and allows the corn
to be sold and delivered by his debtor, in consideration that an agent,
in whose hands $1000 was placed, had agreed to pay him that sum when
the corn should be delivered, it was held, that the verbal promise to pay
the holder of the chattel mortgage was not within the Statute of Frauds,
and that an action would lie for a failure to make the payment: Id.
Reserving a Verbal Trust by a Grantor.-An express trust between
the grantor and grantee of land, that the grantee is to hold the land in
trust for the grantor, or is to reconvey to him in a certain contingency,
is invalid, under the Statute of Frauds, unless evidenced by some writing
signed by the grantee: Stevenson v. Crapnell, 114 Ill.
Resulting Trust- When it Arises.-Where there is an express trust,
there cannot be a resulting or implied trust; and in case of a voluntary
conveyance, no resulting trust can arise in favor of the grantor: Stevenson v. (Jrapnell,114 Ill.
HABEAS Conpus.

Removal of, into nitbd States Court.-A writ of habeas corpus is not
removable from a state court into a circuit court of the United States,
under the Act of March 3d 1875, e. 137, sect. 2: Kurtz v. Moffitt,
S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1885.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Conveyance-Attachment and Levy.-The statute prohibiting conveyances by the wife, without the joinder of her husband, of such real
estate as has been directly or indirectly conveyed to her by her husband,
does not include transfers by attachment and levy for the satisfaction of
her debts. Such real estate is liable to attachment and levy by her
creditors : Virgie v. Stetson, 77 Me.
INSURANCE.

When in the Nature of a Wager.-It would seem that a policy or certificate for the payment of a premium to one who may hold a number
next to that held by the one who dies, and solely because be does die,
makes the transaction in the nature of a wager upon the life of one in
whom the party thus benefited has no interest, and is therefore illegal:
The People v. Golden Rule, 114 Ill.
Agency-Broker-Evidence.-A party desiring to insure certain property, applied to an insurance agent of his place to procure the insurance, leaving him to select the company. He forwarded the application
to certain insurance brokers in Chicago, who procured the policy in a
company with which they had considerable dealing, and sent the same
to the assured through the first named agents, and he sent the premium
to the agents in Chicago, who never forwarded the same to the insurance
company. The policy contained the usual clause that it should not be
binding until the actual payment of the rremium. A loss occurred, and
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payment was refused, when suit was brought on the policy, and a recovery had: held, that the liability of the insurance company depended
upon the fact whether the Chicago agents were its agents, or were authorized to receive payment in its behalf : Sun fut. Izs. Co. v. Saginaw
Barrel Co., 114 Ill.
Where insurance brokers procuring a policy of insurance received
payment of the required premium, and failed to return the same to the
insurance company, it was held that the correspondence between the
brokers and the company was proper evidence for the purpose of showing their previous relations and methods of business, in respect to insurance effected through them, and as tending to, show they were, in fact,
agents of the company, and as-such authorized to receive puyment of
the premium: Id.
Mutual Benefit Associaton-Power of Chancery to en/force Contract.
-A mutual benefit association, a corporation not organized for pecuniary profit, having no surplus, and relying entirely upon mortuary assessments made upon each death of a member for the payment of benefits
to the beneficiaries of decedent, gave a certificate of membership to a
member, in the sum of $5000, whereby it promised, upon proof of his
death, that an assessment should be levied- upon the surviving members
to the amount of the certificate, which sum, when collected, less the
expenses and collection costs, it would pay to, his davisees, in case he lA
any, and if he left none, to his legal heirs. It was he , that a court of
chancery might properly take jurisdiction of a bill brought by the heirs
of the deceased member to enforce payment of the certificatejhy compelling aspecific performance of the contract: -Benefit Associationv. Sears-,
114 III.
See Decedents! Estates
JUDICIAL SALE.
Default of ncrchaser-Resale-Rightto recover Depost.-A judicial
sale was made upon the conditions that the purchaser was required to
pay down ten per cent. of his bid, and pay the remainder at a certain
time; that if any purchaser should not comply with the conditions, then
the property would be offered for sale a second time, and that the first
purchaser would not be benefited by any advance, but would be held
liable for all loss and expense incurred thereby. A. purchased a lot,
paid ten per cent. of his bid, and failed to pay the remainder. The lot
was resold for a sum in excess of the first amount sufficient to pay the
interest on the first bid and the expense of the second sale ; held, that
the first purchaser was entitled to be repaid the ten per cent.: The
Chancellorv. Gummere, 40 N. J. Eq.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Rent received in Cotton-Right of Landlordto enter and pick Cotton.
-The landlord, having rented his land for a certain number of pounds
of cotton, had no right to enter, pick and remove the cotton, against the
will of the tenant, though the cotton was wasting and likely to be
destroyed: Wadley v. Williams, 73 or 74 Ga.
The title to the crop was inthe tenant; the landlord had only a lien
thereon : Id.
The relation of landlord and tenant existed in this case. The land
was let to the defendant in error for a fixed rent to be paid therefor out
of the crop. The contract was not a mere cropping agreement : Id.
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LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See Corporation; Covenant.
Constitutionalityof-Repeal of.-There is a clear distinction between
the effect of statutes of limitation in vesting rights to real and personal
property, and their operation as a defcnce to contracts. Where the
question is as to the removal of the bar of the statute of limitations by
a legislative act, passed after the bar has become perfect, such act, in
the former case, deprives the party defendant of his property, without
due process of law; because, by the law in existence before the repealing act, the property had become his; but in the latter case, it merely
takes away a purely arbitrary defence to an action, which falls with the
repeal of the law on which it depended; and such a defence is not a
right of property which is protected by the fifteenth amendment to the
Constitution of the United States: Campbell v. Bolt, S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term 1885.
MASTER AND SERVANT.

Fellow-,Servants- Who are.-Servants of the same master, to be coemployees or fellow-servants, so as to exempt the master from liability on
account of injuries sustained by one resulting from the negligence of the
other, must be such as are directly co-operating with each other in a
particular business; that is, the same line of employment; or such that
their usual duties shall bring them into habitual consociation, so that
they may exercise a mdtual influence upon each other promotive of proper caution: Rolling-Mill v. Johnson, 114 Ill.
The relations of the servants must be such, that each as to the other,
by the exercise of ordinary caution, can either prevent or remedy, the
negligent acts of the other, or protect himself against its consequences.
Where there is no right or no opportunity of supervision, or where there
is no independent will, and no right or opportunity to take measures to
avoid the negligent acts of another without disobedience to the orders
of an immediate superior, the doctrine exempting the master can have
no application: Id.
MINES AND MINING.

Title to Mineral Lands, how obtained from the Mzited States.-No
title from the United States to land known at the time of sale to be
valuable for its minerals of gold, silver, cinnabar, or copper, can be obtained under the pre-emption or homestead laws, or the town-site laws,
or in any other way than as prescribed by the laws specially authorizing
the sale of such lands, except in the states of Michigan, Wisconsin,
Minnesota, Missouri and Kansas: Deffebach v. Eawke, S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term 1885.
It would seem that there may be an entry of a town-site, even though
within its limits mineral lands arc found, the entry and tle patent being
inoperative as to all lands known at the time to be valuable for their
minerals, or discovered to be such before their occupation and improvement for residences or business, under the town-site title. : 17d.
MORTGAGE.

Liablit
3y of Purchaserof Real Estate subject to-Extension of Time
of -Payment by . greement with Purchaser.-A. purchased real estate
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from B., subject to the payment of a mortgage thereon to 0. Held, that
even though A. had expressly promised B. to pay the mortgage debt,
this would not, without the consent of C., convert B. from a principal
debtor to a surety. 2. The relation. of principal and surety not- existing
between A. and B., an extension of the time of payment of the mortgage debt granted by 0.to A. would not discharge B. from his liability
to C. (It did not appear in this case whether or not B. was prejudiced
by the extension of time for paying the mortgage debt, through depreciation in. the value of the property on which it was secured): Shepherd
v. Nay, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1885.
MUNICIPAL CoIpoRA.TION.

See Taxation.

Police Powes.-Closing Places of Business on &unday.-Cities-and
villages incorporated under the general Incorporation Act, giving power
"to regulate the police of the city or village, and pass and enforce all
necessary police regulations," may pass an ordinance prohibiting persons from keeping open their places of business in such city or village,
for the purpose of vending goods, wares and merchandise on Sunday,
and provide a penalty for a-violation of the same: ZaPherson v. Village
of Chelanse, 1-14 Il.
The police regulations of a village may differ from those of the state
upon the same subject, if they be not inconsistent therewith. A village
ordinance prohibiting the keeping open of places of business on Sunday,
for the sale of goods, ete;, is not inconsistent with the provisions of section 261 of the Criminal Code : 14.
Subdivision 66 of section 62, article .5, of the "Act to provide for the
incorporation of cities and villages," which reads that the city or village
council shall have power " to regulate the police of the city or village,
and, pass and enforce all necessary police regulations,'" is not limited in
its application to the organization and regulation of a police force, but
may extend to, and embrace a subject-matter of police regulation, under
the general police power of the state: .7d-.
NEGLIGENCE.

See Master and ,Senzant.

.Minor- Contributory Neglgence-Railroad-Absenceof Flagman.Where there is no evidence of the want of capacity or discretion in a
minor plaintiff suing a railway company fbr a personal injury from negligence, and he is present at the trial, and' it appears that he was of-such
age and ability to care for himself as to, be trusted by his parents to
attend school in a large city, a considerable distance from home, and to
go-and return by himself, it was held error to instruct the jury that if
believed, from the evidence, that the plaintiff, at the time and place of
the injury, was of such tender years, and was so immature, that the
requisite capacity to exercise proper care was wanting, then the law
would not impute negligence to him. While the same degree of care
might not have been rcqui-ed of hin as from a person of mature years,
it canno' be said that no negligence could be attributed to him: Chicugo,
R. 1. and P. Rd. Co. v. .innger, 114 Ill.
In a suit by a plaintiff, against a railway company, to recover for an
injury received frofia passing train at a public sticet crossini-not in
attempting to cross the track along the street, but while unlawfully walking along the track as a footway-it was held error to instruct the jury
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that if the injury happened because of there being no flagman at the
railroad crossing- to give warning to those about to cross the street and
railroad track at the approach of train at the crossing, contrary to a city
ordinance, then the plaintiff wag entitled to recover: .d.
A requirement of-a railway company to keep a flagman at a public
street crossing in a large city, to give warning of theapproach of trains, is
intended for the protection of persons crossing the railroad tracks at such
crossing, and not for the benefit of persons walking along the railroad
track, employing it as a foot-path. To the latter the company does not
owe the duty in respect to-a flagman : Id.
Railroad-Arson- Contributory Negligene-Burden of Proof.-In
order to support a recovery against a railroad corporation on account of
an injury, or death, caused by a collision with its train at a crossing,
whether the action be in form civil or criminal, it must affirmatively
appear: 1. That the defendant corporation was guilty of negligence.
2. That its negligence was the cause of the accident. 3. That the
injured party was in the exercise of due care and diligence at the time
of the injury, or at least, that the want of such care on his part in no
iay contributed to produce it: State v. Maine Central Rd. Co., 77 Me.
It is not enough to show that the defendant was negligent: 1d.
It is incumbent on the prosecuting party to go further, and directly
or indirectly, by affirmative proof satisfy the jury that no want of due
care on the part of the injured party, helped to produce the accident: Id.
It is negligence to attempt to cross the track of a railroad without
looking and listening to ascertain if a train is approaching, and ordinary
sense, prudence and discretion require this of a traveller so far as he has
an opportunity so to do : Id.
It is still greater negligence for one seeing and hearing a train
approaching at ordinary speed to attempt to cross directly in front of
it: 1d.

PARTITION.
Defence of Eguitable Title-Practice.-In a suit for partition in
chancery, where a defendant sets up an equitable title to the whole
estate in the premises, or impeaches the complainant's title on equitable
grounds, the court will not suspend the suit until the title be settled,
but will pass upon such title and settle all disputes concerning it in the
partition suit, and grant relief accordingly: Read v. Hfuff, 40 N. J.
Eq.
Where a husband pays the consideration of the purchase of lands,
and has the conveyance made to his wife, the presumption is that a gift
or settlement was intended, and a resulting trust will not arise in his
favor from such payment: Id.
The proof which in such cases shall overcome the presumption of a
gift to the wife must be of facts antecedent to or contemporaneous with
the purchase, or else immediately afterwards, so as to be in fact part of
the same transac-ion : and it must be equally satisfactory and explicit
with the pruf requiied to establish a resulting trust ; Id.
PARTNERSHIP.
What constitiues.-Where M. was to conduct a saw-mill, pay its
expenses from the proceeds and divide the net profit with two others,
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and it. further appears that the two others and hinself jointly owned the
mill property it-elf there was elearly a partnership between the parties :
(amp v. .[mit,lon, ryl. 73 or 74 la.
The weight of authority and reason seems to be decidedly in fIvor of
the rule that there may be a legal and valid partnership although lOne
or more of the parties are guaranteed by the others against loss. And
notwithstanding the last clause of section is1o of the Code. that a
**conmon interest in profits alone does not constitute a partnership,"
the rule is the same in this state : Id.
If parties go into an adventure, one furnishing money or stock and
the other skill or labor, and to share the net profits, they are partners,
since they have a joint interest in the profits as coutradistinguished from
the common interest. A fin'tiori is there a partnership where, in
addition to this, there is a joint interest in the property used: ]d.
RAILROAD.

See Contract; .Xttigence.

RECEIvER.

See Corporation; EquIty.
SALE.

Misrepresentatwin-Four hundred and ten shares of the stock of an
electric light company, recently organized, were paid for to the company
by its stockholders, at the rate of one-third of the par value of one hundred dollars a share. The plaintiff sold five of his shares, thus paid for,
to the defendant at par. representing thati all stockholders had paid for
their shares at par. fied, that the plaintiff's statement was a misrepresentation of a material fhct ; that the defendant would have the
riglt to infer from the representation that the company had assets of
forty-one thousand dollars. instead of assets of only one-third of that
amount: Coolidge v. Goddard, 77 Me.
S111PPI Nt.
Earnings-Actionby Part Owners -- lenauts in common must join
in an action to recover the carnings of their vessel uniless there is an
excuse for a severance of the claim ; but bankruptcy of one owner is not
an excuse: in such case the assignee of the owner who is in bankruptcy
must be joined with the solvent owners, or, if an assignee has not been
appointed when the suit is commenced, an action may be supported in
the names of the bankrupt and other owners until an assignee comes in
Stins n v. Fernald, 77 Me.
SPECIFIC P ERFORMANCE.

See .Equity.

TAx.
Public Buildings of Municipal (vrporation.-Buildings and other
property owned by municipal corporations and appropriated to public
uses, are but the means an instrumentalities used for municipal and
governmental purposes, and are. therefore, exempt fron general taxation,
not by express statutory prohibition but by necess:ary implication : Inhabitunts of C('nidi v. Camden b71aqe. 77 Me.
A village corporation was authorized by its charter to raise money to
defray the expenses of a night watch, police force, fire department, &c.,
and also to erect a hall. The building thus erected contained a public
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hall, police court room, assessors' office, lock-up, &e., and, when not in
use for meetings and for purposes of the corporation, the hail and other
rooms were let for hire, and the money received therefrom was used
towards paying the expenses of the corporation. Reid, that the building and lot were not liable to taxation by the town in which they were
situated. Id.
TRUST. See .- 'auds, Statute of.
Resulting Trust.-The title to a house and lot was taken in 1852 in
the name of one R., but the consideration was paid by one D., who, with
his family, continuously occupied the promises thereafter until his death,
and paid the taxes thereon and for all improvements and repairs, without accounting for the rents to R., or being called on by R. to do so.
R., at the request of D., afterwards conveyed the premises to C., who
was D 's daughter by a former wife. Held, that D. had a resulting
trust in the premises, and that his wife, the respondent, was entitled to
dower therein : .Mershon v. Duer, 40 N. J. Eq.
TAX AND TAXATION.

No Collector-Powerof Court of Equity to Appoint Person to Collect the Taxes.-Where the proper officers of a county or town have
levied a tax for the satisfaction of judgments against it, and no one can
be found to accept the office of collector, a court of equity has no jurisdiction to fill that office or to appoint a receiver to perform its functions
Thompson v. Allen Co., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1885.
USURY.
Parol Evidence-Agreezent to Pay Taxes.-The general rule that
parol evidence is not admissible to change the terms of a written contract, has its exceptions, as, in respect to the consideration expressed in
notes and conveyances. Such evidence is also admissible where usury
is pleaded, regardless of the form the transaction may have in the
writings executed by the parties : Kidder v. Vandersloot, 114 Ill.
A person borrowed $2500 on several years' time, and to secure its
payment, with interest, conveyed to the lender eighty acres of land,
taking back a written contract for a reconveyance on payment of the
principal and ten per cent. interest annually, that rate being the highest
then allowed by law to be contracted for, with $20 yearly for taxes on
the land, making $270 annually, and the proof showed that only $250
was in fact paid as interest, and that on payment of that sum, and producing a receipt for the taxes of such year, he was credited with $270.
It was held, the transaction was not usurious, and that the $20 was but
a guaranty for the payment of the taxes, which were chargeable against
the mortgagee by reason of the legal title being in him : -1d.

